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Introduction:
Post-development theory argues that development theory and the practice of PostWorld War II development projects have failed because the entire concept of development is a
Western, non-universal measure of progress. Indeed, examples of failed development
interventions abound from around the world. While development experts argue amongst
themselves about how best to deliver development interventions in order to minimize the
failures of development, post-development theorists believe that no amount of tweaking will
make the development agenda a success. They argue that the problem with development is
not about how it is implemented, but rather that development itself is a flawed concept which
should be eliminated from the discourse on human progress.
The term development encompasses a broad range of ideas, services, and goals. One
such development goal is food security. From a post-development perspective, problems of
food security are not properly addressed by the current development discourse and practice.
Post-development theorists have argued that studies of famine and poverty are incorrectly
depoliticized by development organizations. They argue instead that food security is inherently
political and that there is a distinct disarticulation between agencies delivering food aid and
food security services and the politics of food in recipient countries. A post-development
analysis of food security interventions can identify problems with the development agenda as
well as offer alternatives to development as potential solutions to food insecurity. This paper
will use a post-development perspective to answer the question; do development practices
adequately address issues of food security in Swaziland?
After the theoretical framework and the case-study country background are established,
a post-development analysis of food security in Swaziland will demonstrate the usefulness of
post-development theory in critiquing the development agenda in Swaziland. Furthermore, it
will demonstrate that the premise on which many food security and food aid interventions in
Swaziland are based, is in fact constructed and incorrectly de-politicized by development
organizations. Post-development theory is successful as a critical theory at exposing the flaws
with the mainstream development discourse, but often fails to offer many compelling
alternative solutions or ‘alternatives to development.’ This caused Pieterse Nederveen (2000)
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to write that the post-development idea of ‘alternatives to development’ is “a misnomer
because no such alternatives are offered” (Nederveen 2000). This paper will seek to address
that gap by offering several ‘alternatives to development’ solutions to food security problems in
the case-study country of Swaziland.
Theoretical Framework
Post-development theory developed in the 1980s as a critique of development theory
and practices which post-development theorists viewed as extensions of Western “first world”
hegemonic ideology. The first major post-development critique is that the entire concept of
development is a constructed reality in that “development” is a Western standard whereby the
West is labeled as “developed” and the rest of the world is perceived as “underdeveloped” (Ziai
2007). Development is defined by post-development theorists as practices and ideas beginning
post-World War II attempting to change the “third world” to better match the so-called
developed countries (Kippler 2010). It is important to note here that when post-development
theorists refer to the word development, they are referring to a very narrow definition of
development referring to the post-WWII attempts to engineer particular changes in the socalled ‘Third World.’ Post-development theorists do not call for a return to earlier ways of life
or eschew the desirability of change for those who suffer in poverty. Rather, development is
“understood as the invention of aid structures and practices that would lead to rising living
standards, manifested in an increase in income, which in turn would render better health and
nutrition” (Ahorro 2013). This asserts Western societies as the ideal norm (Parfitt 2002) and
measures the comparative success of all other countries against this norm. Post-development
theorists argue that these values of progress/development are not universal and are actually
“modeled upon the European experience of progress” (Kippler 2010).
According to post-development theory, the construct of development first arose in the
post-WWII era to meet the hopes of new independence leaders, former colonial masters, and
the recently liberated masses (Rahnema 1997). The desire for development, while attractive to
all categories of actors, soon took on various meanings for the different actors. For some,
economic development was important, whereas others focused on social and cultural issues to
be improved upon. Development became an all-encompassing term and policy-driver to define
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progress in areas of health, wealth, education, and infrastructure. Quickly, development
ideology was called into question for its managerial schisms, with some development theorists
arguing for capitalist interventions and others arguing for Marxist interventions. Still others
argued for top-down and some argued for grassroots development (Rahnema 1997). For postdevelopment theorists, however, the problem with development is not how it is delivered, but
rather that the very concept of development itself is flawed (McGregor 2007). Thus, attempts
to reform post-WWII development projects to eliminate their negative effects are seen as
irrelevant because the development solution for the supposed problems of the so-called ‘target
population’ was an incorrect assumption in the first place.
The second major argument of post-development theorists is that the traditional
concept of development is authoritarian in nature and technocratic in execution (Kippler 2010).
Whoever decides what development is and how to achieve it is typically in a position of power.
Development “relies on universal standards for classifying and evaluating societies…and in fact
subordinates countless different perceptions and values of other people” (Ziai 2007). For
instance, if the measure of development used was literacy and each country was ranked
according to literacy rates, this potentially undermines and de-values the importance of oral
tradition in some societies which may thus be considered less “developed” than societies with
higher literacy rates.
There are two waves of post-development theory. Some authors refer to them as the
first and second waves, whereas other authors refer to them as the anti-development school
and the skeptical post-development school (Kippler 2010). Early post-development theorists
focused on rejecting development for its reductionism, universalism, and ethnocentricity
(Ahorro 2013). These authors, writing mostly in the late 1980s-1990s, have often been
critiqued for their rejection of development without qualifying why development is bad. For
instance, child mortality rates have dropped and literacy rates have increased due to the
development agenda (Ahorro 2013) and post-development theorists failed to critique why such
universally accepted improvements in quality of life were negatively impacting developing
countries. These anti-development theorists have been heftily critiqued for romanticizing
traditional subsistence culture and portraying culture as static (Ziai 2007). This paper will not
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focus on this anti-development critique, but rather on the skeptical post-development critiques
which arose later.
The second wave of post-development theory is the focus of this paper. This school of
skeptical post-development theorists focuses more on critiquing the “de-politicizing effects” of
the post-WWII development agenda (Kippler 2010). Skeptical post-development scholars argue
that the development discourse has incorrectly removed the topic of poverty from the political
sphere and placed it in a scientific, apolitical one;

“’Development’ has contributed to the understanding of social life as technical issue, as
a matter of rational decisions and management to be entrusted to those whose
specialized knowledge makes them qualified- the development professionals in
international organizations, national governments and specific development programs.”
(Kippler 2010).

By removing development issues from the political sphere and putting them into the hands of
the technocrat or development expert, one is ignoring the root cause of inequalities and is
instead treating merely a symptom of an inequitable power distribution. The modern state as
the main agent of development (due to its concern with managing social change and economic
growth) is thus subject to much critique from the skeptical post-development theorists.
Furthermore, development projects are seen as the implementation of a modernization
ideology which presupposes that western structures and societies are the only acceptable
model for progress. Post-development theorists view development projects as detrimental in
the countries where they are implemented and authoritarian in form “as directed by intrusive
state mechanisms and international development agencies” (Escobar 1995). Escobar (1995)
deconstructs the development discourse by showing how Western countries established a
norm (standard of development) and norm deviance (underdevelopment) through
institutionalizing development in international organizations. These organizations include the
IMF, the World Bank, the UN, national planning agencies, NGOs, and local development
agencies. These institutions:
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“…all together constitute an apparatus that organizes the production of knowledge and
the deployment of forms of power. This “development apparatus” overlaps with the
process of professionalization of development…” (Kippler 2010).

Post-development critics argue that the institutionalization of the development ideology and
discourse inevitably led to a professionalization of practitioners of development. This took the
power to change one’s community out of the hands of the people and into the hands of the
technical “development expert” who had the apparent development expertise to decide what
to change and how to enact this change. Post-development critics then point to the failure of
such technocrats to reach their intended goals and demonstrate that, in some cases,
development projects have actually been detrimental to their intended recipients. For
instance, Ferguson (1990) found that almost all development projects in Lesotho failed. Due
to the massive numbers of such failed projects implemented by Western experts in the name of
development, Sachs (1992) calls development a “ruin in the intellectual landscape” (Sachs
1992).
One region of the world which post-development scholars often casually highlight as a
failure of development is Africa. Because an African country is the case-study used in this
paper, it is important to examine the post-development literature on Africa. However, very
little has been written by post-development scholars on various African societies’ experience
with the development discourse and implementation. Matthews (2004) argues that postdevelopment theory is relevant to Africa and that more attention to post-development theories
should be paid by African scholars. Furthermore, post-development theory’s roots in critical
theory also decry the painting of “Africa” as a homogenous entity (Matthews 2004). Postdevelopment critiques of development in Africa therefore are productive on an individual casestudy basis. Ferguson’s (1990) critique of the development agenda in Lesotho shows first that
the World Bank constructed a myth of subsistence living (when in actuality 70% of rural
homesteads had wage-earners in South Africa) and secondly, that attempts to commercialize
livestock there in the name of development failed due to an incompatibility with cultural values

7

placed on cattle ownership and local power relations (Ferguson 1990). Post-development
theorists are highly critical of the development agenda precisely in such situations when local
cultural values are undermined or eliminated in the name of the Western values of
development. Development theorist Eutounga-Manguelle (2000) examines the failure of
development in Africa and blames African cultural values for the failure, citing their resistance
to change. Post-development theorists argue that instead of Eutounga-Manguelle’s insistence
that African values be eliminated so as to fit the development agenda, the development agenda
itself is the problem which must be eliminated in African societies (Matthews 2004).
The call for an “end to development” does not mean we should stop searching for new
possibilities, but rather that a transformation must occur at the populace level that enhances
“inborn and cultural capacities” according to culturally defined aspirations (Rahnema 1997).
Post-development theorists call for an end to development so that we can “leave it behind in
pursuit of radically alternative visions of social life” (Kippler 2010). Post-development theorists
argue instead for “alternatives to development,” such as grassroots movements (Rahnema
1997). Because the present development ideology is viewed as authoritarian and ethnocentric,
a new definition for progress could only be reached through a democratic consensus by the
people concerned (Kippler 2010). Key to this prescription is the idea that people must feel a
sense of ownership, power, and importance in any community undertaking or the project is
doomed to failure. Thus, the goal of post-development theorists is a transfer of power to
define a society’s goals and problems from development experts into the hands of the people
(Ziai 2004). Post-development theorists point towards grassroots movements and the so-called
New Social Movements as successful and democratic steps towards progress. Isolated
examples of societies rejecting the development agenda entirely have also been examined by
post-development theorists. N’Dione (1994) points out that the exchange of goods promoted
by the development agenda failed in a Senegalese community because the Senegalese placed
value on the giving of goods rather than on the free-market exchange promoted by
development. By insisting on maintaining their own values of goods, the community was able
to successfully reject the demands placed on them by development (N’Dione 1994).
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As development became a technical and scientific profession, all aspects of
development were subsequently de-politicized, including issues of poverty, famine, and food
security. This de-politicization into the technical field can be seen in the weak language used by
development organizations when faced with famine in recipient countries. Even In the case of
Zimbabwe, food aid organizations are not overly critical of policy as the root cause of famine,
and instead vaguely blame “corruption” and “weak institutions” for food insecurity (Smith
2003).
Post-development theorists argue that the current practice of development, particularly
in regards to food aid and food security, is incorrectly depoliticized by development
practitioners. Smith (2003) argues:

“…one of the reasons development often fails to meet the challenges of problems like
food security is the fact that politics and political concerns are systematically removed
from the issue…It is palpably false to ignore the politics of food security, both in terms of
the causes and the solutions to famine…” (Smith 2003).
And:
“(Food security) is ultimately about one’s position in society…Food security is the
ultimate manifestation of who wields power, and who does not” (Smith 2003).

To a post-development theorist, poverty, famine and food security are issues of power in
southern Africa. Access to productive assets, land, labor, water, and capital is controlled by
complex systems of tribal and local law, state intervention, and development institutions such
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Smith 2003). At times, these systems
may be at odds with each other, such as land allocation under tribal versus local law or
obligations of the state versus obligations of development institutions. Due to these implicit
and explicit contradictions, famine can be seen as the result of an inequitable political process.
Post-development theorists call for an end to the de-politicization of food security and food aid
programs, and instead argue that they are and should issues that are dealt with in a democratic
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political arena. Post-development theorists are also concerned that this de-politicization of
food security has muddled the clarity of which institutions have a duty to ensure food security:

“In many ways, food security and the risk of famine epitomize the disarticulation
between the State in a less developed country and the development provider, such as
the United Nations. If famine is about power and politics broadly understood,
ultimately famine itself can become a backdrop to arguments over responsibility and
power.” (Smith 2003).

With complex national and international networks of food aid and food security development
programs in place, the duty to prevent famine and hunger rests on everyone and no one. “The
result is often a fragmented, inefficient and inadequate capacity to deal with food security
issues when they arise…Within this context, the ability of southern African states to deal with
food insecurity is severely compromised and inherently politicized” (Smith 2003).
Methodology
This capstone paper will analyze food security issues from a post-development
perspective through the case study of the Kingdom of Swaziland. Swaziland offers itself as a
compelling country to conduct a post-development case study of food security in for several
reasons. First, Swaziland is almost entirely ethnically, linguistically, and culturally homogenous.
Post-development theory insists that differences in cultural values affect the society’s
relationship to development in different ways, and so Swaziland presents a rare opportunity to
study a single country with unified cultural values in relation to development. Second,
Swaziland has suffered from chronic food insecurity for decades according to development
experts, and has been subject to development interventions such as food aid and agricultural
reforms since the beginning of development practice. Therefore, an examination of food aid
and food security development initiatives is warranted and information on Swazi food security
issues is readily available from the development industry.
The case study methodology has several advantages and disadvantages. One clear
advantage of the case-study methodology lies in its ability to dissect a specific case thoroughly
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without the danger of over-generalizing a concept. This paper will allow for in-depth analysis of
a variety of food security issues and illustrate the merits of post-development theory as a
framework from which to view food security and development practice issues. However, this
level of detail also renders a case study weaker when attempting to apply the theory
elsewhere. The Kingdom of Swaziland has unique political, cultural, and agricultural traditions
which prevent this paper’s post-development analysis of food security issues and their potential
solutions to be applied in other cases.
Post-development theorists use a variety of methods for gathering evidence to support
their arguments, and this paper will also use a post-development framework for gathering data
on the case of Swaziland. Post-development theorists use a human-centered approach,
meaning that they;

“…represent a perception of reality from the perspective of the human beings involved
in the processes of change… It is rather to find out whom these serve or exclude, and
how they affect the human condition and the relational fabric of the society into which
they are introduced” (Rahnema 1997).

Post-development scholars are interested in hearing the voices of people who are directly
affected by and involved in the development discourse in order to learn solutions for
‘alternatives-to-development’;

“People directly affected and studied by post-development scholarship need to be
heard without preconceptions and prejudice, to allow them the same opportunity to
share their thoughts and concerns and therefore offer a genuine contribution towards
prescriptions through alternatives-to-development’.” (Escobar 1995).

This paper will utilize interviews with individuals who work on food aid and food security issues
in Swaziland to determine what the challenges to food security in Swaziland are. Furthermore,
the interviewees will provide their own perspectives on post-development solutions to food
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security issues in Swaziland. Interviews were conducted with the following individuals; two
Ministry of Agriculture extension officers who work on issues of food aid and food security, two
directors of independent, grassroots food security non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
two with employees of the two largest food aid donors in Swaziland, and one with a university
professor working on food security issues in Swaziland (see Appendix A). All individuals
interviewed had extensive experience working both with food aid and food security. Five of the
interviewees were native Swazis, and two were foreign-born but living in Swaziland long-term.
In addition to first-person interviews, this capstone project will utilize a mixture of datagathering tools to generate qualitative information analysis. Through newspaper articles,
academic publications, government publications, and organizational publications on the topics
of food aid and food security in Swaziland, an image of the country’s food security situation can
be formed broadly.
Limitations
Post-development theory has received extensive critique for its rejection of
development theory. For instance, a large proportion of development projects have arisen
from the developing world itself, which could negate the post-development idea that
development theory is Western dominated and hegemonic (Edelman 1999). The United
Nations’ Human Development Index has demonstrated a rise in human “development” since
large-scale development projects began post-World War II (Roesling 2006), indicating that the
post-development argument that the development agenda is detrimental is incorrect. The
aforementioned critiques of post-development theory are noteworthy in that they illustrate the
potential limitations and contradictions of post-development theory which may arise in this
capstone research paper.
However, post-development theory is still a useful theory to use to examine food
security issues, as it allows the populations subjected to the development agenda to have a
voice which identifies their own culturally perceived problems and indigenous solutions to be
heard. Additionally, many post-development scholars have addressed the aforementioned
critiques. Edelman’s (1999) critique that development projects were initiated by development
recipient countries themselves does not take into consideration the national power dynamics
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acknowledged by post-development scholars. Rahnema (1997) points out that support for the
development agenda in recipient countries was in no way unanimous and that those
participating in the development agenda were authoritarian and undemocratic:

“This almost unanimous support for development was somehow significant of the very
gap it had started to produce in societies in which it had been introduced. For now it
appears clearly that such unanimity was far from being shared at the grassroots level,
where it was supposed to reach the suffering populations. Only the ‘authorities’ who
were speaking on behalf of their ‘target populations’ claimed that such was the case.
The voices that, here and there, were heard across the barriers separating the rulers
from the ruled, showed that the latter had never been seriously consulted.” (Rahnema
1997).

Additional concerns raised by scholars who cite that ever-decreasing poverty levels are a sign of
the development agenda working are also addressed by post-development scholars. To them,
the entire development discourse is based on Western ideas of progress, and if authoritarian
and ethnocentric elements of development are to be avoided, then it would be impossible to
define development normatively (Kippler 2010).
A further limitation of this study is the limited pool of interviewees and their own
unwillingness to disclose information which might have appeared critical of their respective
employers, be they government or development organizations. There are high levels of selfcensorship as well as official censorship in the Kingdom of Swaziland, so the qualitative data
from the interviews may have been limited. Along those same lines, the politicization of food
aid and food security in Swaziland is a narrow case study which should not be used to draw
conclusions about food security issues in other African countries. This is due to the fact that
Swaziland is the last remaining absolute monarchy in Africa, and no other African government
shares its same legal, cultural, and political framework.
Literature Review
On Food Security
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According to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the definition of food
security has evolved over the years (FAO 2006). The term “food security” arose in the 1970s
during a period of food crisis. Originally, food security definitions focused primarily on food
supply issues related to availability, but the definition has grown over time to be more inclusive
of all issues surrounding the food system (Webb et al. 2009). One commonly used definition of
food security was established by the 1996 World Food Summit. This definition states that food
security:

“…exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient,
safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an
active and healthy life” (FAO 2006).

A later definition by the FAO adds an emphasis to the social aspect of food security that
was missing in the 1996 one. According to this definition, food security:

“…exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food
preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO 2006).

In a later document, the FAO (2006) describes 4 key aspects of food security: Food must be
available in sufficient quantities and quality. Food must be accessible. Food must be utilized
properly through adequate diets to meet all physiological needs. This proper utilization of food
includes important non-food inputs such as clean water and sanitation to ensure health.
Finally, food must be stable, meaning that all individuals must have access to adequate food at
all times. Stable food systems can sustain sudden shocks such as economic or climatic crises
(FAO 2006). Availability and access are the food security indicators utilized in the most minimal
definitions of food security and are therefore the frame of reference for “food security” in this
paper. Furthermore, most measurement tools of food insecurity focus on these two aspects of
food insecurity.
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There is no universally accepted measurement of food insecurity (Webb et al. 2009).
Furthermore, agencies attempting to record food insecurity often have difficulty differentiating
between varying community, household, and individual levels of food insecurity (Webb et al.
2006). Proxy measures of food security typically used include; agricultural production, food
storage levels, caloric intake, per capita income, or nutritional status (Coates et al. 2003).
Webb et al. (2009) find these measures unsatisfactory, and prefer to measure food insecurity
through subjective measures such as working through anthropologists, focus groups, and
surveys. One such subjective measurement tool was developed by Swindale and Bilinsky
(2009), and their Household Food Insecurity Access Scale was found to be a sensitive indicator
of changes in household food security (Swindale and Bilinsky 2009).
For the purposes of this paper, food security will be measured based on the perception
of the source discussing food security since post-development theory is interested in individual
values. For instance, if a World Food Program document measures the food security situation
in Swaziland to be highly food insecure, but an interviewee does not see the food security
situation as being dire, a post-development argument could glean that there is a disconnect
between the development agenda and cultural values. For instance, Ferguson (1990) used a
post-development analysis of agricultural development programs in Lesotho and found that the
development literature over-emphasized reliance on subsistence agriculture in order to appear
successful and necessary. Similarly, measures of food security in Swaziland may also indicate
disconnect between what development practitioners publish in order to justify their work and
the perceived reality on the ground. Therefore, interviewees will be allowed to subjectively
measure the level of food security in Swaziland.
On Food Aid
Post-development theory critiques development practice’s complex international and
national development delivery system through which issues of poverty and famine are removed
from the political sphere and placed into a technocratic one. One of the most direct forms of
development assistance is the delivery of food aid. In Swaziland, non-emergency food aid
consists of a generous portion of official development assistance, and it is therefore necessary
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to understand as the most significant development ideology response to food security issues in
Swaziland.
This paper will define food aid as direct donations of food from one donor country or
organization to a recipient country. Typically, food aid varies from other types of “development
aid” in that it is seen as a short-term disaster relief measure (Berazneva and Lee 2011). The
main agents of food aid organization and donation are typically under the United Nations (UN),
government donors, or non-governmental voluntary organizations. Within the UN framework,
the three agencies dealing with food emergencies are the World Food Program (WFP), the High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCF), and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). A
typical food aid supply chain is as follows;
Government donorinternational agencyinternational NGOslocal NGOs in aid-recipient
countriescommunity-based organizationsindividual aid recipients (Oloruntoba and Gray
2006).
Government donors are made up almost exclusively of Canada, the United States, and
European countries, and these donors are responsible for most of the food and financial
resources in food aid delivery. Furthermore, strict rules from the United States (the largest
donor by far) demand that most of the donated food be grown in the United States (Loyn
2013). This practice is highly controversial due to its apparent protectionism of US agricultural
products, and recently USAID director Rajiv Shah stated that more than four million additional
people could be fed every year if this rule did not exist (Loyn 2013). This is due to the
comparative cost of US agricultural products, whereas locally sourced food has lower
purchasing and shipping costs. Post-development theorists would here point to such
protectionist trade policies as being an exertion of Western hegemonic power over the
countries receiving food aid.
The evolution of food aid programs reflects a long-term shift in outlook on the part of
donor countries and organizations. Large scale food aid from the United States was established
in 1954 through Public Law 480 (“Food for Peace Program”) and was primarily used as a vehicle
for exporting surplus government food supplies. Commodity sales through loans to
governments and grants to government for food aid sale (known as food aid monetization)
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accounted for half of food aid until being largely phased out in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Seventy-three percent of food aid today is used for emergencies, including protracted relief
operations, refugee programs, and natural and manmade disasters (IRIN 2012). The food aid
industry today consists of a complex, international network of stakeholders with a broad variety
of interests and expertise.
Over the years, methods of assessing hunger and distributing food aid have drastically
changed. Food aid programs today are carefully monitored for specific outcomes and are often
supposed to address underlying causes of hunger. For instance, targeted food aid interventions
have become increasingly common in recent years as donors prefer to target the most
vulnerable populations. One example of “targeted food rations” is the delivery of food aid to
households affected by HIV/AIDS. Targeted food rations for people living with HIV/AIDS may
increase labor supply and productivity of subsistence food production, thereby increasing
household food security. Another development in the distribution of food aid is “food for
work” or “food for knowledge” models, in which recipients receive food aid in exchange for
physical labor on community projects, life skills/health classes, or school attendance. These
types of food aid programs are common in Swaziland and account for large amounts of food aid
there.
A common and controversial practice in the food aid industry is its monetization. The
monetization of food aid occurs when donated food aid supplies are sold (typically by agents of
the recipient country) and the proceeds of these sales are then used to support general budget
or developmental activities such as trainings or technology purchases (US Food Aid and Security
2012). In 2010, 14% of US food aid was officially monetized through approval by the USDA.
Proponents of monetization argue that recipient countries can allocate the money generated
through monetization in more effective, lasting programs to combat food insecurity causes (US
Food Aid and Security 2012). This practice is significant when examining food security practice
in Swaziland, as it is often used and is highly controversial among Swazis.
Critics of food aid abound and include the post-development theorists. Food aid has
been criticized for a lack of industry regulation, slow crisis response rate, poor inter-agency
coordination, and technical incompetence (Rinehart and Geffen 2002). Food aid has also been
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used or perceived as a political tool used by donors to assert their political will or power on a
nation or region (Knack 2001), a view which is shared by post-development theorists due to the
hegemonic power relationship between the donor and recipient.
Post-development theorists often claim that development has failed in practice. In the
case of food aid, many scholars have examined if this claim holds true. Economists often
examine the effects of food aid on local production and market prices. Many studies focus on
the apparent disincentive effects of food aid on domestic agriculture. Donovan et al. (2006)
found that food aid can have strong negative effects when it is distributed during harvest, when
very large quantities are released into countries that have markets that operate with similar
locally produced products, and when the food aid is likely to be sold to a local market. Mabuza
et al. (2009) examined the impact of food aid on maize prices and production in Swaziland.
They found that food aid in Swaziland does not lower prices and has no significant negative
effect on the quantity of maize produced in the following seasons (Mabuza et al. 2009).
Country Profile
Seventy percent of Swazis are subsistence farmers, and two-thirds of Swaziland’s 1.1
million people live in chronic poverty (IRIN 2012). Swaziland has a Gini coefficient of over .60,
meaning that wealth is extremely unequally distributed. In terms of physical characteristics,
Swaziland has a diverse topography and climate despite its small size, with tropical and near
temperate temperatures, mountains, hills, and sloping plains (Southern African Development
Community 2007). Principle exports are sugarcane (representing 60% of the total GDP) and
wood pulp (SADC 2007). Medium and large scale farms employ workers, accounting for 20% of
the country’s formal employment. Most agricultural commodities are produced on Swazi
Nation Land and Title Deed Land (SADC 2007). Title Deed Land is land owned primarily by
wealthy Swazis and is used for commercial farming and cattle grazing. Title Deed Land
produces mostly sugar, and accounts for 26% of all cultivated land, whereas Swazi Nation Land,
granted to communities from the king via chieftainships, accounts for the remaining 74% of
cultivated land (Panin and Hlope 2013). The bulk of Swaziland’s economy depends on the
agricultural sector, and the processing and manufacturing sectors also depend on agricultural
inputs.
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The vestiges of colonial land policy and traditional land laws impact Swaziland’s food
security. Swaziland was a low priority for the British upon its formal acquisition in 1902. Swazis
were immediately granted rights to 1/3 of all Swazi land from which they could grow their own
crops, which was seen as extremely generous in the eyes of the British (Potholm 1972), but
created a system by which Swazis did not have access to the most arable land. The other 2/3 of
Swazi land was divided between Crown Land (for the profit of the British Empire) and private
land for white settlers (Blauer and Laure 1996). Only 15% of the land granted to Swazis was
suitable for farming whereas 75% of white settler land could be farmed (Blauer and Laure
1996). The Crown Land and white settler land shares became increasingly commercialized.
Loss of arable land coupled with a rise in commercial food production served to essentially
deplete Swazis of their subsistence livelihoods, permanently re-orienting the food system away
from the communal and towards the commercial. When conditions in Swazi territory worsened
and as the British needed funds for WWII, the British allowed Swaziland to re-purchase land
held by white settlers in 1940. The British also returned some of the Crown Land. King Sobhuza
II soon imposed a cattle tax scheme to buy back the land, and by 1946, 350,000 acres of land
were returned to the Swazis via the Native Land Settlement Scheme (Blauer and Laure 1996).
Despite these returns, more than 30% of Swaziland remained in white hands or was sold to
wealthy Swazis (Blauer and Laure 1996). Following independence, many Swazis pushed to reclaim white land, but King Sobhuza II resisted (Kuper 1986). Thus, some of the most
commercially profitable land (specifically the sugar cane plantations) does not contribute
significantly to Swaziland’s food security, as the vast majority of these crops are exported.
Food security in Swaziland is historically linked to the success of maize crops (MOAC
2005). Maize is grown by most subsistence farmers, as it is the staple food of Swaziland. It
represents 80% of crop production on Swazi Nation Land (SADC 2007). By 2001, Swaziland was
almost 96% self-sufficient in maize production (Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy
Analysis Network 2003). However, this deteriorated rapidly in the following years, to the point
where it now produces only 40% of Swaziland’s maize consumption. Up until 2000, Swaziland
produced over 100,000 tons of maize, but this has steadily decreased since then, with average
yearly yields being around 70,000 tons (World Food Programme 2012).
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During the lean season each year from October-March, the number of food insecure
people increases dramatically (World Food Programme 2012). Emergency assessments of food
security in Swaziland by NGOS have reported that 40% of Swazi children are stunted due to
chronic malnutrition, a further 11% are undernourished, and 2% are wasted due to acute
malnutrition (MOAC 2005). In a study on the role of subsistence agriculture’s contribution to
food security in Swaziland, Panin and Hlope (2013) found that 63% of households surveyed
experienced food shortages and found that “subsistence agriculture is capable of ensuring food
security to only 37% of the sampled households” (Panin and Hlope 2013). However, Panin and
Hlope (2013) also found that “on average, the estimated net available food for consumption
per household was more than the average estimated minimum household’s food requirement”
(Panin and Hlope 2013). This implies that subsistence agriculture is not the only source of food
for most households. A study conducted by the African Food Security Urban Network found
that Swaziland’s largest town, Manzini, is the most food insecure urban area in all of southern
Africa (Crush et al. 2012).
Food aid came to Swaziland on a large scale around the time Swaziland gained its
independence and has been a constant presence in many poor communities in Swaziland ever
since. The World Food Programme (WFP) was the first large international food aid presence in
Swaziland starting in the late 1960s. The WFP country operation was terminated in 1996, but
the WFP re-entered Swaziland in 2002 in response to the 2001/2002 regional drought (World
Food Programme 2012). Since then, the WFP has shifted its food aid program to target
beneficiaries of particularly vulnerable populations; people living with HIV/AIDS and TB,
orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs), women, and schoolchildren.
Currently, WFP and World Vision are the largest providers of food aid in Swaziland.
Donor countries between 1990 and 2003 include the USA (42% of food aid), the European
Commission (21%), Switzerland (13%) and other countries including Sweden, Libya, Italy, Japan,
Finland, and Germany (WFP 2009). The number of food aid recipients varies drastically from
year to year due to both climatic changes and donor shortfalls. Food aid piqued in 2007 when
over two-thirds of the population received food aid, but in 2013 only about one-tenth of the
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population received food aid (IRIN 2013). Commodities received as food aid include maize, rice,
beans, corn soya blend, skim milk, and vegetable oil (Mabuza et al. 2009).
Distribution of food aid in Swaziland is geographically uneven, and the most food
insecure areas are targeted by the annual National Vulnerability Assessment Committee and
the Government’s Early Warning System. The traditionally food-insecure areas of the Lowveld
and Lubombo are the only areas where targeted households and schoolchildren currently
receive food rations from the WFP, although the WFP’s Food by Prescription program operates
at government hospitals throughout the country (World Food Programme 2012).
Food aid to Swaziland continues at a high rate, but with many donors de-prioritizing
Swaziland, some attempts have been made to hand over food aid distribution to local
authorities. In 2008, WFP began a three-year Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO
106020) aimed at improving food security and productive capacity in the most vulnerable
households impacted by the HIV/AIDS epidemic and natural disasters (World Food Programme
2012). In May 2010, WFP and the Swazi government prioritized three areas of the PRRO due to
resource shortfalls; support orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) at neighborhood care
points, support OVCs undergoing farming and life skills training, and support to patients in antiretroviral, tuberculosis and prevention of mother-to-child transmission programs under the
Food by Prescription program (World Food Programme 2012).
Analysis
Subjective Measures of Food Security and Food Security Challenges
Post-development theory emphasizes that the aspirations of development practice do
not necessarily reflect the needs and aspirations of the populations they target. Past studies
have shown that issues relevant to development practitioners were not perceived as important
by the recipients of those specific development interventions. For this reason, the interviewees
were asked to describe food security and the challenges to food security in their own words.
Their responses indicated that the perception of food insecurity in Swaziland is seen as less
urgent on the ground than in the eyes of high-level development institutions. When asked to
describe the food security situation in Swaziland, all but Interviewee 7 (a high-level employee of
a major food aid distributor) indicated that the situation was manageable.
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Excerpts from Interviewees 1 through 6 show that there is a distinct disconnect between
the perception of the level of food security between development institutions and the
population in question. Interviewees 1 through 6 made statements about Swaziland’s level of
food insecurity which weakened this defense:
•

“I think it’s not so bad. People have land and can work the land.” (Interviewee
1).

•

“I don’t know. They (development organizations) tell us it’s a problem, so I guess
it is…” (Interviewee 2).

•

“These people aren’t starving. It’s a question of what story you believe. A
starving African child is compelling, but how many of them are actually starving?
None. Last time we had real starvation challenges was 1992 and that was
because it didn’t rain that year.” (Interviewee 3).

•

“The food-for-learning programs are only there because the donors are too lazy
to come up with a creative response to food security problems.” (Interviewee 4).

•

“I think that it is something we are told. But go out into the communities and
see how the people support each other. The only time we’re food insecure is
during drought and when they plant maize in the lowveld.” (Interiewee 5).

•

“Swaziland is food insecure, but starvation is not an imminent threat. Balanced
diets are key to proper food security, and that is what is lacking.” (Interviewee
6).

Interviews revealed that development organizations operating in Swaziland view the food
security situation as urgent and dire, whereas the local practitioners working on food security
issues on the ground clearly did not perceive food security issues with the same urgency. This
re-enforces the emphasis made by post-development theorists that local communities must be
allowed to determine priority areas for improvement without the influence of donor
aspirations.
After defining food security and rating it in their own terms, the interviewees were
asked to list what they perceived to be challenges to Swaziland’s food security. Once again, a
strong disconnect was found between what the development literature had written about food
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security and what the practitioners found to be challenges. While the literature
overwhelmingly emphasized the HIV/AIDS epidemic, only two Interviewees (2 and 5) agreed
when prompted by the interviewer that HIV affects food security. Instead, Interviewees
focused overwhelmingly on challenges which are absent or barely mentioned in the literature
of development organizations (specifically the use of outdated agricultural practices and land
allocation policies). Large-scale food aid and food security interventions in Swaziland typically
do not address these challenges described by food security practitioners. This shows the lack of
democratic involvement by the target populations in decisions made by development agencies
regarding food security interventions. For post-development theorists, this is one of the main
flaws of development ideology and contributes to the high failure rate of development projects.

Factors Affecting Food Security
8
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6
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3
2
1
0

Number of interviewees listing
the factor

Figure 1: Important factors affecting food security according to 7 food security practitioners

The areas affecting food security in Swaziland as described by the development
literature or the interviewees are analyzed from a post-development framework below.
Land allocation affects long-term food security
Development experts are found to de-politicize issues of food security. However, postdevelopment theorists argue that food security issues are inherently political and should be
dealt with in the political sphere. In subsistence agricultural societies like rural Swaziland, more
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land means more food security. Thus, the allocation of land is vital to determining who has
food security. According to Smith (2003), “food security is the ultimate manifestation of who
wields power, and who does not.” Therefore, if land is allocated in a politically inequitable way
by those in power, then food security should be lower than in cases where it is distributed
equitably. Both the literature and the interviewees indicated that land allocation is an
important aspect to food security, and that land allocation is highly political. Thus, land
allocation is an important factor affecting food security in Swaziland according to postdevelopment theory.
In the case of Swaziland, there are two different types of land allocation affecting food
security. The first discussed below is the inequitable distribution of Swazi Nation Land by
traditional authorities (chiefs) to their subjects. The second type of allocation affecting food
security is the capitulation of chiefs to give agricultural lands for non-agricultural developments.
In the first type of allocation, if a rural farmer in Swaziland is out of favor with the local
traditional authorities, he or she may not be granted more land or may even legally be removed
from their holdings. One’s success or failure as a subsistence farmer is largely dependent upon
one’s relationship to those in power and one’s willingness to provide tribute labor to the king or
the chief (Russell 1992). Furthermore, the distribution of Swazi Nation Land “undoubtedly
inhibits the crystallization of some inequalities as clearly as they create others” (Russell 1988).
The traditional authorities through whom Swazi Nation Land is allocated have often been
accused of marginalizing the poor, particularly women and orphans. Furthermore, traditional
land inheritance practices dictate that the inheritor shall be male, which in some instances
forces the widows from the land (Russell 1988). This in turn increases food insecurity among
women and children. Some critics have argued that the system of Swazi Nation Land (currently
about 75% of Swaziland is Swazi Nation Land) contributes to food insecurity because the
essential “squatting” system of farming conducted on Swazi Nation Land leaves farmers
without legal recourse or land to claim as collateral when applying for bank loans (IRIN 2011).
Interviewees 1 and 3 mentioned that the inability to apply for a loan using their land as
collateral was detrimental to small-holder farmers.
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The average landholding size on Swazi Nation Land is 1.7 hectares, and this continues to
fragment into smaller units with population growth (Mabuza et al. 2009) and the use of Swazi
Nation Land for non-agricultural development (FANRPAN 2003). With an outwardly expanding
population in the cities, the amount of available land to use for subsistence or commercial
agriculture is diminishing. Five of the food security practitioners interviewed mentioned that
the practice of developing land for non-agricultural purposes along with population growth are
worrying trends that they believe have the potential to derail food security in the next ten
years. According to Interviewee 1:

“The Malkerns Valley area is seeing a lot of residential construction. This is very arable
land that could be used for production purposes. The Land Use Department is not doing
its job.”

This quote makes it clear that the development agenda does not match local goals and needs in
terms of food security. While the development of the wealthy Malkerns valley area may be
seen as development by the modernization agenda, it is in fact permanently altering the most
fertile part of the country away from agricultural production and food security to the long-term
detriment of locals. Along a similar vein, Interviewee 4 pointed out that Manzini is the most
food insecure city in southern Africa and said that the dismantling of Swazi Nation Land was at
least partially to blame: “Give me landed poor over landless poor any day. If you have land, you
can feed yourself.”
The interviewees quoted above clearly saw the importance of sound land policy and
also discussed political corruption in the traditional land allocation scheme. For example, King
Mswati III’s semi-private business and agricultural enterprise Tibiyo Takangwane is apparently
notorious for forcing rural areas into giving up fertile lands with threats of political retribution if
they encounter resistance. In this case, the national political elites use their political might to
force the traditional authorities to comply. Additionally, Interviewee 1 specifically blamed the
Land Use Department for not doing its job properly, meaning that bureaucratic government
agencies are perceived to have an important role to play in terms of food security. Given the
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power of authorities granting land in Swaziland, the process of land allocation is detrimental to
food security due to the inequitable power relations seen in the process of allocation.
The Role of Government Agricultural Programs in Food Aid and Food Security
In a country as food insecure as Swaziland supposedly is, it stands to reason that the
government would devote vast amounts of resources to programs promoting food security and
agricultural development. However, agricultural spending represents 4% of the national budget
and much of that spending goes to semi-public commercial farming enterprises owned by the
King (IRIN 2013). Four of the interviewees indicated that meager government spending on
agricultural programs negatively impact food security. Interviewees and the literature revealed
a multitude of ways in which government spending influences food security; not enough
extension officers, a lack of input and equipment assistance to farmers, and the presence of
development organizations taking on the role of government.
Post-development theorists view institutions modeled off of Western ideals as
inappropriate for their framework of “alternatives to development.” In Swaziland, the
decentralization of the agricultural ministry into a series of regional offices with agricultural
extension officers was modeled off of the American system of agricultural extension workers.
Furthermore, the formation of farming cooperatives working with the extension offices is also
modeled off of the American system. Mainstream post-development theorists would view this
practice as the hegemonic political will of the Western donors who helped shape agricultural
policy around the independence era. Nevertheless, extension offices are now recognized by
Swazis as legitimate actors in both food aid and food security interventions. According to postdevelopment theory, their role in providing food security is political because political elites
chose the amount of resources they allocated to agricultural programs which promote food
security or provide food aid.
The government of the Kingdom of Swaziland provides free research and extension
services to all farmers as well as renting farming equipment at highly subsidized rates (Mabuza
et al. 2009). Extension officers tend to be overstretched, however, with one extension officer
being held responsible for anywhere from 800-1,000 smallholder farmers. One extension
officer (Interviewee 2) put it this way: “Our RDA has over 800 farmers. That area is supposed to
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be served by 24 officers, but we are only 2.” The extension workers interviewed stated that
they could help farmers achieve better food security if they weren’t stretched so thin with
limited resources. For instance, travel costs were not compensated for one extension worker
who worked with roughly 1,000 farmers, making site visits impossible. Furthermore, farming
equipment rentals were often backed up. Agricultural experts in specific fields such as
livestock, chicken breeding, and fruit tree propagation are in such short supply that there are
only one or two specialists in each field in the entire country, making it impossible for farmers
wishing to diversify their crops to get the training that they need. The extension officers
interviewed argued that government didn’t budget enough for agricultural services, and should
instead re-allocate money from the bloated Swaziland United Defense Forces, which represent
17% of the national budget despite Swaziland never having been to war in modern history (IRIN
2013). The International Monetary Fund and other development organizations have also often
echoed this sentiment (IRIN 2011).
The role of government versus the role of development agency is often unclear in the
Swazi agricultural sector, which potentially leads to lower government spending on food
security programs. Government and aid agencies often work together and both feel they have
the same duties to provide food security. For instance, government extension officers monitor
the food security situation on the ground, and when they see crops failing and an impending
food crisis, they contact the food aid agencies working in their area to respond. Government
extension workers then become food aid workers, distributing aid and recording aid delivery for
the donor. This creates a blurry distinction between the role of government and the role of the
food aid organizations in terms of who has the duty to provide food to the people.
Furthermore, World Vision, the second largest distributor of food aid in Swaziland, also has
many agricultural officers who work in the same communities and even on the same projects as
many extension officers. In such instances, the role of the government officers versus the
development agency officers is not clearly delineated and creates bureaucratic redundancies.
Even members of Parliament seem unclear on the role of government in improving food
security. When it comes time to create the budget, members of Parliament from largely
agricultural districts do not push for larger budgetary allocations to agriculture, but rather are
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often found lobbying the donor community for food aid and projects. This demonstrates that
development ideology has become so engrained in the minds of the political elite in Swaziland
that issues of food security are incorrectly removed from the political agenda in Parliament.
Despite the purported ideal of development organizations to “work themselves out of a
job,” aid organizations in Swaziland seem reluctant to relinquish any of their responsibility to
government. The two largest food aid organizations in Swaziland have not presented a political
strategy for their government counterparts and remain apolitical in their work with low-level
Ministry of Agriculture employees (extension workers). The only joint food security framework
between the WFP and the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland are recommendations for
shifting responsibility of food aid over to government (PRRO 2008), and the plan has yet to be
initiated or discussed in Parliament. This lack of a political framework between development
organizations and the Swazi government suggests that development organizations in Swaziland
prefer to remain apolitical. According to post-development theory, the development
organizations are, as an extension of the Western modernization agenda, therefore exerting
power over Swaziland by not taking issue with and politicizing the lack of government spending
on food security programs. Post-development theory argues that the development
organizations’ insistence on remaining apolitical is an incorrect stance, as the lack of
government resource allocation to food security issues reinforces the perceived necessity of
development organizations. The de-politicizing of food security by development agencies
represents an extension of Western hegemonic ideology in that it closes off local alternatives
from democratically arising. As long as the development agencies are in place, their solutions
to the challenges to food security will be addressed entirely in the technocratic development
sphere and will not be addressed adequately in a legal or political framework. Interviews
revealed that many food security issues (including government spending on agriculture) are
ones that necessitate a political solution. In terms of resource allocation to agriculture, the
interviews revealed that the development industry fails to adequately recognize or reconcile
this challenge to food security in Swaziland.
Economic Performance
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A weak economy is also a potential contributor to food insecurity in Swaziland,
according to the development literature. The 2011 financial crisis in Swaziland worsened the
nation’s already crisis-level food insecurity. According to a United Nations (UN) Country Team
Rapid Assessment report released in March of 2012, “…food security seems to have
deteriorated as households have been coping with the consequences of the fiscal crisis
combined with the rising food price” (UN Swaziland 2012). According to the report, the
financial crisis beginning in 2011 has caused half of rural households and one third of urban
households to cut their number of meals or meal portions. In more than one fourth of rural
households, meals were skipped for an entire day (UN Swaziland 2012). With Swaziland’s GDP
still in decline, the IMF has predicted that by 2014, Swaziland’s economic performance will fall
below Somalia’s and thereby become the worst performing economy in the world (IRIN 2013).
This prediction does not bode well for the food security situation of the country.
None of the food aid or food security experts interviewed noted economic performance or
job loss as a cause of food insecurity in Swaziland. This indicates that development ideology’s
perception that there is a strong correlation between food security and market performance in
Swaziland may not actually be the case. This is potentially due to the perception among
educated Swazis that subsistence farmers in the rural areas can produce their own food
irrespective of the national economic performance. Furthermore, the mythos that the majority
of the population is subsistence farmers may not accurately reflect the reality, as remittances
sent by homestead wage-earners who work in town or in South Africa account for a significant
amount of rural income. Or, as Interviewee 4 put it: “You have to work pretty hard to starve in
Swaziland.”
Agricultural practices and customs
All seven of the food security experts interviewed emphasized that at least some of
Swaziland’s food insecurity is caused by inefficient and outdated agricultural practices and
customs. Soil erosion is one major cause for concern, with vast canyons of previously arable
land collapsing in and expanding across large territories seemingly overnight. It is estimated
that 75% of Swazi Nation Land suffers from degradation due to soil erosion. Soil erosion
damages soil structure and reduces soil nutrients, thereby decreasing crop yields. There are
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several causes of soil erosion in Swaziland. Although some soil erosion is due to weather
(extended periods of drought), the vast majority of soil erosion is man-made. A common
practice in the rural areas is to burn fields and grasslands during the dry season, and this greatly
deteriorates the quality of soil over time. Furthermore, overgrazing by cattle and monocropping maize are significant causes of soil erosion.
Additionally, over-reliance on maize as a staple crop even in environments where it is
unsuited is a major cause of food insecurity in Swaziland. Maize is a crop requiring high input
costs, constant care, crop rotation, and plenty of moisture. None of those things are prevalent
in abundance in the Shiselweni or Lubombo regions of Swaziland, yet most subsistence farmers
in these areas continue to grow maize, as it is their staple food of choice. This preference for
maize developed during the colonial era when maize was introduced, despite the fact that the
crop sorghum grows better in Swaziland and was previously the staple food of choice. It is no
coincidence, therefore, that the World Food Programme, World Vision, and the government of
the Kingdom of Swaziland all list the Shiselweni and Lubombo regions as being the most foodinsecure in Swaziland (UNICEF 2009). Shiselweni and Lubombo disproportionately receive vast
quantities of both emergency and programmatic food aid due to the failure of maize crops and
extended drought periods there. Extension officers and food security NGOs in those regions
work to reduce maize dependence and introduce water harvesting techniques, but all
interviewees expressed frustrations with a cultural preference for the tried and true maize
crop. Furthermore, all school-going children are taught about good agricultural practices in
school, so the issue of using poor agricultural practices is not related to information access but
rather behavior change.
In addition to agricultural practices, certain cultural customs surrounding food have the
potential to affect food security. Food insecurity in Swaziland is often referred to as an issue of
food quality, not food quantity (UNICEF 2009). As Interviewee 3 explained:

“The problem in Swaziland is a micronutrient one. The children are stunted due to early
childhood malnutrition. They are fed a massive portion of (maize) pap, but a single
tomato or onion is put in a sauce and divided amongst 10 family members. This causes
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cognitive delay and stunting. And it’s not that there’s not education out there on
balanced diets. It’s a food preference thing. Not knowing how to flavor their vegetables
to make them palatable keeps people from eating them with anything other than
massive amounts of salt” (Interviewee 3).

As shown above, food security is affected by dietary preference as well as food availability.
Maize is prevalent in abundance in the rural areas, but vegetable gardens are far less common
and more labor-intensive to produce, which leads to a dearth in vegetable availability. Over
time, this led to a preference for the readily available maize crop. While filling, the nutritional
content of maize is not sufficient to provide the quality of healthy food needed to be food
secure. Post-development theorists argue that solutions must be grass-root and come from the
people, but when the vast majority of Swazis have a palate for nutrient-poor food; it is unlikely
that a grassroots movement to change the national food preference would occur.
HIV/AIDS epidemic
Swaziland has the highest HIV rate in the world with 26% of the population between 15 and
49 infected and 54% of pregnant women testing positive (Terry and Ryder 2007). In 2002, AIDS
accounted for 64% of deaths in Swaziland (WHO World Health Statistics 2006). At the
epidemic’s pique in 2004, life expectancy was the lowest in the world at just 32 (IRIN 2009). In
2004, HIV was declared a national emergency and since then, enrollment on anti-retroviral
therapy for people living with HIV has steadily risen the life expectancy to 49 (CIA World
Factbook 2013). The World Food Programme lists HIV/AIDS as one of the leading causes of
hunger in Swaziland (WFP 2012). Himmelgreen et al. (2009) have traced the complex
relationship between food insecurity and the HIV/AIDS epidemic in southern Africa using
syndemic theory. Syndemic theory refers to the interaction among diseases under conditions
of poverty “which results in an amplification of negative health outcomes” (Himmelgreen et al.
2009). Similarly, the new variant famine theory posits that in places where HIV/AIDS morbidity
and mortality rates have created household labor shortages and a loss of relevant skills, there is
reduced food production and loss of income (De Waal and Whiteside 2003), resulting in greater
food insecurity. The interaction between labor shortages and skills loss is noted as a leading
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cause of decreased crop yield and food insecurity in Swaziland (WFP 2012), according to the
literature of food aid organizations. Child-headed households are particularly food insecure,
and these represent 15% of all Swazi households (Terry and Ryder 2007). T
While much has been published on the effects of HIV on food security, only two of those
interviewed mentioned it as a leading cause of food insecurity in Swaziland and only did so
when prompted by the interviewer. The rest agreed that it certainly contributed to food
insecurity when prompted by the interviewer, but did not believe that it was the most
significant factor related to food insecurity in Swaziland. The gap between the literature and
the food security practitioners on the ground may be due to a difference in variables taken into
account. Researchers interested in the relationship between food security and HIV typically
used the presence of HIV as the only variable effecting food security in their studies, making
HIV the most significant variable by default. For the food security practitioners interviewed, a
broad range of human and environmental causes of food insecurity had to be considered,
making HIV a significant (but not the most significant) cause of food insecurity. This once again
highlights the discrepancy between development ideology priorities and those of the local
population.
Furthermore, much of the food aid in Swaziland is justified by development agencies
due to the high rate of HIV. Food-by-prescription programs are in place in every regional health
center, with homesteads receiving food rations when one or more members have HIV. Regular
programmatic food aid is also justified as being necessary due to the high HIV rate. However,
interviewees did not perceive HIV to effect food security as drastically as it is portrayed in the
development literature. Interviewee 3 even pointed out the harmful effects that food aid has
on their target populations when discussing food aid designed specifically for individual
homesteads with HIV/AIDS:

“On the one hand, food-by-prescription programs stigmatize the recipient homestead
and also cause jealousy in the community. In the communities, people cannot see if HIV
really makes you to have less food. And what about the hungry ones who are negative?
There are cultural systems in place which are supposed to protect homesteads that have
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sick members. The children of other homesteads should be sent to help harvest and a
neighbor is supposed to ask the bandla lomcane (chief’s inner council) to help them.
I’ve seen this way work and I don’t know how the extra maize might change this…Also,
how is this (food-by-prescription) sustainable?” (Interviewee 3).

Based on the above, post-development theorists would argue that development expert
attempts to provide food security to homesteads affected by HIV have failed and actually had
negative consequences. Post-development theory illustrates here that the local cultural
traditions and cultural values of community service and equitable division of assets were
ignored in favor of a blanket one-size-fits-all development ideology practice. Instead, postdevelopment theorists call for a democratic and people-driven solution to food security issues,
rather than a technocratic development solution.
Climatic factors (drought)
Climate plays an important role in food security. If poor climatic conditions exist, a food
system must be stable enough to absorb the shocks caused on the food system by bad weather.
In Swaziland, the food system is not capable of absorbing shocks caused by bad weather,
typically in the form of hail storms or drought. Three of the interviewees listed drought as a
cause of food insecurity in Swaziland, and most food aid organizations in Swaziland monitor the
drought situation from year to year and give large amounts of emergency food aid to respond
to conditions of drought (WFP 2012). Swaziland also occasionally suffers from damaging hailstorms caused by typhoons off of the coast of Mozambique. The question of whether or not
development can adequately solve this challenge to food security is a moot point, as
development practice has no power over weather and climatic conditions. Instead, one must
examine their response to this challenge in the form of food aid (see next section).
Role of food aid in food security
Post-development theorists view development organizations as a kind of neo-colonial
exertion of power on “developing” countries to fit into the Western ideal of progress without
regard for indigenous movements or preferences. Given this, it is important to examine the
role that food aid plays in promoting food security. If food aid is significant, then the presence
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of food aid in Swaziland is justified from a humanitarian perspective. However, none of the
interviewees listed food aid as a practice which contributes to food security. Furthermore,
most of the interviewees referred to food aid as ineffective or a “short-term” solution to a
larger problem. Interviewee 3 referred to food aid as a “Band-aid on a bullet wound.”
Interviewee 5 described it as:

“…cosmetic. The impact is almost insignificant. It’s like the story of teaching someone
how to fish. Once it is finished, so what? As much as I appreciate it, but the impact is
nothing” (Interviewee 5).

There was a distinct difference in opinion about the positive effects of food aid on food security
between the two interviewees who worked for organizations distributing food aid and the five
interviewees who did not work for those organizations. The five that did not work for food aid
organizations all commented that food aid was not a long-term solution to food insecurity, and
that it is over-used in Swaziland. Three of the five who had been contracted as individuals or
through the government to help with aid distribution all saw imminent starvation due to crop
failure as the only acceptable time to roll out food aid. Interviewee 3 described their
experience with food aid distribution as follows:

“Food aid should be run with military precision and rationing. Any more than a year and
you start to see disincentive effects. During the 1992 drought, I was contacted by WFP
to distribute in 11 chiefdoms. I was always careful to do it in neutral areas. I refused to
do it at Umphakatsis (the community meeting place). I fought with local chiefs on that.
It ensures that the right people feel safe to come and get it. I also insisted on unloading
from the trucks into the warehouse so that it didn’t get hectic. You have to do it
militarily. You also have to do it tough. If a family claims 10 kids, you have the man
come over and name his children. Whatever name he starts hesitating on, stop giving
rations at that point. Any other kids do not exist….Would they have starved without the
food aid? In that year of the drought-yes. Now? No. Just go a year and see what
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happens. I bet you anything they’re still alive. Those people aren’t dying if you don’t
give them food” (Interviewee 3).

The interviewee quoted above brought up the political nature of food aid without being
prompted by the interviewer. In order to counteract the influence of local political elites
effecting which families got access to the food aid, this individual arranged for food aid to be
delivered at sports grounds and schools, which are known in Swaziland for being “neutral”
zones where local traditional authorities have little influence. Interviewee 2 also described an
instance of corruption at the Umphakatsis:

“There was this NERCHA (National Emergency Response Council for HIV/AIDS) project to
give farm inputs to Umphakatsi to feed the OVCs (orphans and vulnerable children). In
some of the Umphakatsi I saw, the food ended up being eaten by the powerful guys and
did not benefit the children” (Interviewee 2).

Both of the above examples describe instances where local political elites attempted to
exploit the food aid system. Historically, food aid to Swaziland has been fraught with
controversies surrounding its distribution. There is, on the one hand, the situation of
inequitable distribution as arranged by the chiefs to those who are in their favor, as mentioned
by the interviewees. At the national level, there are also problems surrounding its large-scale
distribution. A national scandal erupted in 2013 when the Times of Swaziland published several
articles revealing that over $3 million US dollars’ worth of food aid donated by Japan had been
sold and the money deposited to the Central Bank of Swaziland (IRIN 2013). While the
monetization of food aid in Swaziland is a common practice, it is not widely known by the
populace that this goes on, and donors seldom demand accountability from the Swazi
government to prove that the donated food was sold to supplement farming inputs and
farming programs. In the case of the Japanese food aid in 2013, the money was deposited to
the Central Bank of Swaziland, which clearly violated the monetization agreement that the
money should be spent on farming inputs. Later in 2013, a parliamentarian inspected a
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government warehouse of food aid, only to discover the vast majority of it rotting and unfit for
human consumption (IRIN 2013). Both national scandals point to the lack of government
accountability with food aid. Post-development theorists would argue that such failures and
instances of corruption clearly demonstrate a failure of development ideology to live up to its
noble and paternalistic intentions.
Furthermore, the use of “food for work” or “food for education” model commonly
utilized by almost every NGO operating in Swaziland was criticized by Interviewee 4 for creating
dependencies:

“They drain the NGOs and have created dependency where people expect food where
before they would have expected nothing. The biggest problem is that they aren’t
working within existing frameworks. Corruption is also rife and problematic when they
just go to Umphakatsi and start something new without seeing that there are already
existing community structures providing the service.”

The interviewee points out an interesting problem faced by communities which have
development organizations working in them. Many times, the community has indigenous
structures in place for providing services. For instance, the communal fields at Umphakatsi are
traditionally planted and harvested communally and used to feed hungry constituents within
the chieftaincy. With the introduction of Western food aid, some chieftaincies abandoned this
practice or scaled it back dramatically, thus decreasing the food security of their entire
communities. In other chieftaincies, there have been cases of individuals burning entire fields
in order to get their community to qualify for food aid. Thus, the introduction of the Western
development ideology practice of food aid undermined local traditions, with devastating
consequences. From a post-development perspective, food aid was the priority of the
development experts and not of the community which already had existing structures in place
to address food insecurity. Had these so-called experts consulted with the local populations
and democratically involved them in the process of increasing their own food security, there
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might be a sustainable, culturally appropriate solution to food security in place today instead of
an aid-dependent one.
Another example of food aid hurting traditional structures was through the introduction
of Neighborhood Care Points (NCPs) which distribute food aid to orphans and vulnerable
children. The WFP describes the NCP feeding program as follows:

“The NCP feeding programme is one of the only social safety nets for OVC under the age
of five that covers children on a national scale, and is an important component in
mitigating the impact of HIV and AIDS on children in Swaziland.” (WFP 2013).

This statement contrasts drastically from what interviewees said about the NCP program, which
they did not even acknowledge as being a provider of food security. According to one food
security expert interviewed, the introduction of the NCPs into the community caused many preexisting preschools to dissolve and the preschool teachers to lose their jobs once free food was
available elsewhere in the community. Furthermore, these structures negatively impacted
family structures. As Interviewee 4 described:

“I had a man come to me complaining about (the local NCP). His brother died and he
had assumed care over his orphan nephew. But the nephew wouldn’t listen to his rules
or accept his uncle as his new caretaker because he got all his meals for free from the
NCP. Since most homesteads care for orphans, they’ve really fractured the family when
the orphans don’t get their meals from the same authority figure. It’s destroying closeknit communities and turned them into those receiving handouts and those who aren’t”
(Interviewee 4).

Post-development theorists would view these effects of food aid as deeply problematic,
as they harm or undermine indigenous knowledge and community “alternatives to
development” for the sake of increased dependence on the benevolence of western donors. In
its literature on the NCP program, the WFP does not acknowledge indigenous solutions to food
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security recognized by the interviewees, but rather states that the NCPs are “one of the only”
means to food security in the communities. Furthermore, Swaziland is a communal society
with strict rules governing the egalitarian distribution of food (hence the division of Umphakatsi
crops among needy constituents). Even the act of eating in front of another person without
sharing what one has is offensive. Given this, the selection of very specific fragment “targets”
of the population by food aid donors (OVCs, school-going children, and homesteads with
HIV/AIDS) has the potential to negatively impact social life and actually erode food security at
the community level. Some indigenous ‘alternatives to development’ solutions to food security
issues in Swaziland are discussed in the recommendation section below.
Conclusions
This paper sought to answer the question; do development practices adequately
address issues of food security in Swaziland? Interviews with practitioners of food security and
food aid programs in Swaziland revealed that food security interventions in Swaziland do not
adequately address issues of food security. While development experts over-emphasized the
role of HIV in food security issues and commonly used food aid as a food security intervention,
practitioners found that other issues not addressed by the development industry more
profoundly affect food security. The biggest challenges to food security, as perceived by food
security practitioners, were the use of poor farming practices, land allocation policies, and a
lack of government resources. None of these challenges is addressed by development
interventions in Swaziland. This disconnect between what the development industry identified
as problematic and what local food security practitioners believe emphasizes the undemocratic
and “scientific” nature of development criticized by post-development theorists. Outside
“experts” are responsible for addressing the problems that they identify without local
involvement, and these experts then create interventions targeted at the Swazi population
without regard for culturally appropriate solutions. Furthermore, development interventions
were found to harm local, indigenous solutions to food security problems, which is another
problematic aspect of development.
The role of food aid in food security was found to be insignificant or even detrimental by
all but one of the food security practitioners who had worked on food aid distribution in the
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past. Furthermore, post-development theory is less concerned with who has the duty to
provide food security and more concerned with how communities rise up from the grassroots
to solve issues of food insecurity indigenously. For this reason, Western food aid organizations
which provide food aid are seen as an impediment or a distraction from grassroots progress.
The data revealed that this belief was also held by most food security practitioners interviewed.
These findings reinforce the validity of post-development’s rejection of development as
an ideology and as a practice. Post-development theory argues that development is concerned
with implementing programs at “target” populations without their involvement in deciding
what aspects of their lives need “developing” and how to best go about that. Indeed, food
insecurity was perceived more benignly than the development literature suggests.
Furthermore, the challenges to food security as identified by the technocratic, so-called
development experts varied significantly from the causes identified by field workers. These
findings show the importance of community involvement in creating solutions to food security
problems.
These findings also suggest that other countries which receive food security/food aid
development assistance re-examine the development framework as a whole and instead look
towards local, democratic food security solutions as a means to addressing food insecurity.
One avenue for further research would be to conduct a closer examination of how the power
dynamics between rural Swazis on Swazi Nation Land, local chiefs, and national political figures
affect food security. Another area that needs further research is a thorough investigation
focusing exclusively on the social effects of food aid programs in Swaziland by interviewing and
surveying recipient communities.
Recommendations
Post-development theorists argue for an ‘alternatives to development’ agenda to
address issues of poverty and progress. ‘Alternatives to development’ are democratic in nature
and solve the problems which the local community perceives to be important without the
influence of development interventions. Interviewees provided a wealth of suggestions for
improving food security in Swaziland (see Appendix B for their complete list of suggestions).
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Their suggestions discussed below answer the question; what are some ‘alternatives to
development’ solutions to food security issues in Swaziland?
The first task to making Swaziland more food-secure is to place issues of food security
back into the political sphere, because some of the key causes of food insecurity in Swaziland
are inherently political issues. As such, food security issues are incorrectly depoliticized by both
food aid organizations and by the government of the Kingdom of Swaziland. The second most
common challenge to food security mentioned by the interviewees (5 of the 7) related to better
land allocation. One of the most pressing political issues that must be dealt with urgently by
Parliament is the expansion of non-agricultural development into Swazi Nation Land. The
present laws regarding the use of Swazi Nation Land for non-agricultural purposes by private
individuals are unclear and unknown to many local chiefs. Furthermore, the displacement of
Swazi Nation Land dwellers from these lands must also be dealt with. A call for clearer
agricultural policies in general could help with this. Suggestions for improving land tenure laws
included giving subsistence farmers legal holding rights to their land, thereby allowing them to
use their farms as collateral when applying for bank loans. This could also prevent the rightful
family residing on disputed land from being forcibly removed from their holdings for political
reasons, as this would grant them legal rights to stay.
The next most common challenge mentioned by interviewees was to improve
government agricultural programs (4 of the 7). Most advocated for more agriculturally friendly
land and pricing policies as well as greater government spending in the agricultural sector.
During policy-making, lawmakers must acknowledge that government funding of agricultural
programs play an important role in food security and prioritize funding for agricultural
programs. Additionally, food aid organizations must participate in political policy-making
decisions with the government and work jointly with the Ministry of Agriculture to develop and
implement these plans with an eye towards sustainable programming and dependency
reduction. Furthermore, development organizations which at the present time spend a great
deal of time and resources on food aid can instead divert their energies towards partnering
with the Ministry of Agriculture to professionalize and expand the scope of extension officers.
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Additionally, interviewees suggested that government control the prices of agricultural inputs
to ensure that subsistence farmers have access to the inputs they need to produce high yields.
The next task after re-politicizing food security and addressing agricultural policy issues
politically is to work with local communities to adapt new and indigenous technologies for
better farming practices in general. The most common suggestions by the interviewees (7 of 7)
related to the adaptation of appropriate technologies and better farming practices. These
recommendations reinforce the finding that better agricultural practices produce higher yields
and make Swaziland more food secure. A culturally appropriate solution (derived from
grassroots food security workers) might be to rekindle the rich and sustainable Swazi
agricultural traditions of the past. For instance, legume crops and pumpkins used to be planted
underneath maize in a double-cropping method. These crops put nitrogen back into the soil
and help to mitigate the mineral drain of the maize crop. In addition, they help with dietary
diversity. The use of positive indigenous practices such as this (which have only very recently
been abandoned by some farmers) could revitalize the soil and lead to higher maize yields.
Many potential Swazi ‘alternatives to development’ solutions to food security issues already
exist at the community level. These solutions include the use of the fields at Umphakatsi to be
donated to hungry constituents. Additionally, backyard gardens and crop diversification could
reduce food security problems in the rural areas, which tend to be overly reliant on maize. In
the past, Swazis ate a rich diet of wild plants, berries, and even many insects to give them the
nutrients they needed. These practices are receiving revitalization in some rural areas, but
could be helped by a national movement calling for the return of preference for these
traditional Swazi dietary staples. Furthermore, the use of sorghum as the staple crop in areas
where maize is unfit is also a traditional Swazi practice which could increase food security.
Other solutions suggested which are not necessarily “Swazi” in origin but could help to improve
food security include the use of conservation agriculture techniques, better irrigation
infrastructure, and the increased use of biotechnology. These practices could potentially
increase food security if the desire for them arises democratically among the people.
Finally, it is important to note the discord between the focus of scholars studying food
security and the focus of food security practitioners on the ground. The practitioners
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interviewed in this study all witnessed practices on the ground that they saw as detrimental to
food security which could be easily remedied through political change and improved farming
practices. Scholars and development experts studying the food security situation in any
country should therefore make a concerted effort to engage grassroots-level food security
agents in order gain a realistic understanding of barriers to community-level food security.
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Appendix A

Index of Interviewees

Interviewee 1: Ministry of Agriculture Extension Officer
Interviewee 2: Ministry of Agriculture Extension Officer
Interviewee 3: Grassroots food security organization (local)-Director
Interviewee 4: Grassroots food security organization (local)- Training Manager
Interviewee 5: University professor who researches indigenous agriculture
Interviewee 6: Food aid organization employee
Interviewee 7: Food aid organization employee
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Appendix B
‘Alternatives to Development’
Suggestions made by food security practitioners to improving food security in Swaziland:
•

irrigation infrastructure

•

modern farming techniques

•

permaculture techniques and the use of conservation agriculture

•

farmer-friendly land tenure laws

•

the promotion of legume crops

•

increased use of biotechnology and GMO crops

•

using positive indigenous practices (such as double-cropping)

•

crop diversification and specialty crops

•

greater innovation diffusion directed to small scale farmers

•

greater professionalization of extension officers

•

increased use of backyard gardens

•

investment in small-holder farms and loans to small-holder farms

•

clearer agricultural policies in general

•

identify champions of research and technological innovations

•

government allocate more money to agriculture

•

controlled input prices
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